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Plaintiff-Appellant ParkWest Homes LLC ("ParkWest") respectfully submits its 
reply to the arguments raised in this appeal by Intervenor-Respondent Residential Funding Real 
Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"). 
I. REPLY 
Apparently hoping to sidestep the dispositive issues presented on appeal by 
ParkWest, and undoubtedly with the added hope of infusing maximum confusion into what this 
court is now being asked to decide, Residential "restates" ParkWest's issues based on the 
disingenuous assertion that "the issues on appeal should be stated as follows: .... "1 RB 7. As a 
1 Compare Appellant's Brief ("AB") 11 (Issues Presented on Appeal), with Respondent's 
Brief ("RB") 7 (Issues Presented on Appeal). The issues presented on appeal by ParkWest were 
stated and argued in its opening brief as follows: 
AB 11. 
A. Did the district court err in ruling the lis pendens 
and Barnson Judgment that ParkWest recorded against the 
Property failed to provide Residential with constructive notice of 
this civil action and ParkWest's lien in the Property? 
B. Did the district court err in ruling that the priority of 
ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien in the Property was lost when 
the Barnson Judgment became a final judgment under Idaho law? 
C. Did the district court err in ruling the "law ofthe 
case" doctrine does not preclude Residential from litigating 
additional challenges to the validity of Park West's lien in the 
Property, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Barnson I holding the lien to be valid? 
D. Did the district court err in ruling that the interest in 
the Property acquired by Residential was held by the trustee under 
the MERS' Deed of Trust, rather than by Barnson as the owner of 
the Property and trustor and MERS as the designated trust 
beneficiary? 
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result of Residential's so-called restatement of the issues and its related briefing, a coherent 
rebuttal of Residential's principal arguments to the issues now on appeal requires ParkWest to 
extract and coalesce the relevant arguments made by Residential from the incongruous portions 
of its brief where they are found and then address them in the context of the four issues presented 
on appeal by ParkWest. Before doing so, however, ParkWest will first summarize and rebut 
Residential's elemental statutory argument, which is set forth in its brief under the heading: 
"ParkWest cannot show an exception to the [sic] Idaho Code section 45-510 which would permit 
its Lien to trump Residential's interest in the Property." RB 18 (bolding omitted). 
A. The Harmonization of Idaho Code Sections 45-1506(10) and 45-510 
Establishes That Residential Acquired Its Interest in the Property Subject to 
ParkWest's Lien. 
ParkWest agrees with Residential's argument that "Idaho Code 
sections 45-1506(10) and 45-510 must be harmonized, not read as mutually exclusive." RB 22. 
ParkWest also agrees that '''[w]hen interpreting the meaning of the language contained in a 
statute, ... [t]he Supreme Court will not construe a statute in a way which makes mere 
surplusage of provisions included therein.'" Id. (quoting Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 
149 Idaho 107, 116,233 P.3d 38, 47 (2009)). But as also explained by the decision in Bradbury: 
"'Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and those words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed as a whole.'" 
149 Idaho at 116,233 P.3d at 47 (quoting Cordova v. Bonneville Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93, 
144 Idaho 637, 641, 167 P.3d 774, 778 (2007)). 
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The two statutes here at issue are in tum quoted below in their entirety, with their 
relevant provisions being applied to the facts presented in this appeal. 
Idaho Code Section 45-1506(10) provides as follows: 
The trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest 
in the property, which [i] the grantor had, or had the power to 
convey, at the time of the execution by him of the trust deed 
together with [ii] any interest the grantor or his successors in 
interest acquired after the execution of such trust deed. 
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, as the two emphasized phrases establish, the deed (the "Trustee's 
Deed") given in connection with the nonjudicial foreclosure of the trust deed (the "MERS' Deed 
of Trust") that encumbered the Canyon County residence (the "Property") previously owned by 
Defendant Julie G. Bamson ("Bamson") could convey but two categories of interests to 
Residential: (i) those interests in the Property that Bamson had, or had the power to convey,2 
when she executed the MERS' Deed of Trust, and (ii) those interests in the Property that 
Bamson or her successors in interest acquired after she executed the MERS' Deed of Trust.3 
Accordingly, the undisputed evidence before this court establishes that the only interest in the 
Property that could be conveyed to Residential by the Trustee's Deed was the fee interest 
2 Residential has presented no fact or argument supporting a contention that Bamson had 
the power to convey anything other than her fee interest in the Property when she executed the 
MERS' Deed of Trust. 
3 Residential has presented no fact or argument supporting a contention that there was any 
successor-in-interest to Bamson's interest in the Property (other than Residential itself) or that 
Bamson acquired any additional interest in the Property after she executed the MERS' Deed of 
Trust. Indeed, not only did Bamson not contest and avoid ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien 
after she executed the MERS' Deed of Trust, but the lien was reduced to a stipulated final 
judgment (the "Bamson Judgment") to the extent of Barns on's interest in the Property some six 
months before the date of the Trustee's Deed. 
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Barnson held when she executed the MERS' Deed of Trust. In this regard, and as argued by 
ParkWest in its opening brief: 
Thus, because ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien attached to the 
Property when ParkWest commenced construction of Barns on's 
residence six months before the MERS' Deed of Trust was 
executed and recorded, Barnson's interest in the Property was 
encumbered by ParkWest's lien "at the time ofthe execution by 
[Barnson] of the trust deed ... ," [citing Section 45-1506(10)]; and 
therefore the Trustee's Deed could convey to Residential no more 
than Barnson' s encumbered interest in the Property. 
AB 34 (initial alteration and ellipsis in original; footnote omitted). 
Residential must therefore argue that giving effect to the literal wording of 
Section 45-1506(10) "reads Idaho Code section 45-510 out of existence." RB 21. But Section 
45-510 provides no more than as follows: 
No lien provided for in this chapter binds any building, 
mining claim, improvement or structure for a longer period than 
six (6) months after the claim has been filed, unless proceedings be 
commenced in a proper court within that time to enforce such lien; 
or unless a payment on account is made, or extension of credit 
given with expiration date thereof, and such payment or credit and 
expiration date, is indorsed on the record ofthe lien, then six (6) 
months after the date of such payment or expiration of extension. 
The lien of a final judgment obtained on any lien provided for in 
this chapter shall cease five (5) years from the date the judgment 
becomes final, but if such period of five (5) years has expired or 
will expire before September 1, 1947, the owner of such judgment 
lien shall have until September 1, 1947, within which to levy 
execution under such judgment. 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, contrary to Residential's unsupported assertion that Section 45-510 
requires a lien claimant "to commence proceedings [within six months] against all persons and 
entitles [sic] who claim a right in the Property[,]" RB 22 (emphasis added), the statute only 
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requires that "proceedings be commenced in a proper court within that time to enforce such 
lien .... "4 Residential's unsupported assertion is also, of course, contrary to established Idaho 
precedent. See, e.g., Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Prods., Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 
685,682 P.2d 635,638 (Ct. App. 1984) [hereinafter Bonner] ("no statute mandates the joinder of 
specific parties to a lien foreclosure action. In fact, I.C. § 45-1302 indicates to the contrary. "). 
In sum, because there are no conflicting provisions between the two statutes here 
at issue, there is nothing contained in Section 45-510 that would support this court's 
interpretation of Section 45-1506(10) as not limiting the interest conveyed by the Trustee's Deed 
to Barnson's fee interest encumbered by ParkWest's lien. Or stated otherwise, the 
"harmonization" ofIdaho Code Section 45-1506(10) and 45-510 requires no more than that all of 
the provisions in the two statutes be given effect and that all of the words used in each statute be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, in accordance with the established rules of 
statutory construction. 
B. The Recorded Lis Pendens and Bamson Judgment Provided Residential 
With Constructive Notice of This Civil Action and ParkWest's Lien. 
Residential wholly fails to address, let alone rebut, ParkWest's argument that the 
recorded Bamson Judgment provided Residential with constructive notice ofthis action and 
ParkWest's lien. In fact, Residential fails to mention any ofIdaho's recording statutes quoted by 
ParkWest or any of the decisions cited and quoted by ParkWest in support of its argument. See, 
e.g., IDAHO CODE § 55-801 ("Any instrument or judgment affecting the title to or possession of 
4 Residential has presented no fact or argument supporting a contention that ParkWest 
failed to timely commence its lien foreclosure action against Bamson and MERS. 
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real property may be recorded under this chapter."); and Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 
195-96, 30 P .3d 970, 973-74 (2001) ("a purchaser is charged with every fact shown by the 
records and is presumed to know every other fact which an examination suggested by the records 
would have disclosed."). 
Additionally, Residential implicitly admits that ParkWest's two recorded lis 
pendens also provided Residential with constructive notice of this action and ParkWest's lien in 
the Property by the admission: "The Lis Pendens provides notice only that ParkWest's Lien was 
extinguished as against First American and its successors in interest." RB 22 (bolding omitted). 
In other words, ifParkWest's two lis pendens provided Residential with constructive notice of 
anything pertaining to this action and ParkWest's lien, they would have also provided 
Residential with notice of everything pertaining to this action and ParkWest's lien based on the 
holding in Kalange just quoted. Indeed, Residential explicitly admits that "[t]he case cited by 
ParkWest to support this 'lis pendens' argument - in fact, the very language quoted by ParkWest 
- supports a finding that Residential takes title subject only to the rights of the parties to the 
lawsuit .... "5 RB 26. And, of course, that is the very point of the first issue that was presented 
on appeal. 
5 Ie., Sartain v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 775 P.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1989): 
The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the common law 
principle that when a third party - with actual or constructive 
notice of a pending action involving real property - acquires an 
interest in that real property from a party to the action, then the 
third party takes subject to the rights of the parties in the action as 
finally determined by the judgment or decree. Idaho Code § 5-505 
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Accordingly, Residential's so-called rebuttal to ParkWest's first issue on appeal is 
reduced to the argument that the constructive notice provided to Residential by the recorded lis 
pendens and Barnson Judgment is "irrelevant." See RB 22 ("Notice Is Irrelevant To The 
Section 45-510 Analysis, And Therefore Neither The Lis Pendens Nor The Barnson Judgment 
Have Any Effect ... " (bolding omitted)).6 The relevancy of the fact that Residential had 
constructive notice of this lawsuit and ParkWest's lien, however, is established by the legal 
principles articulated in Note 5, supra.7 
C. The Priority of ParkWest's Lien Was Not Lost When the Barnson Judgment 
Became a Final Judgment Under Idaho Law. 
As in the proceedings before the district court, Residential does not contest in this 
appeal any of the following matters argued by ParkWest: 
provides for the filing of a lis pendens which serves as constructive 
notice under the doctrine. When a subsequent purchaser or 
encumbrancer has actual knowledge of an action affecting its right 
or interest in real property, a notice of lis pendens need not be filed 
by the party advancing the claim. 
116 Idaho at 272, 775 P.2d at 164 (internal and concluding citations omitted). 
6 In light of Residential's implicit concession that it had constructive notice of this action 
and ParkWest's lien before purchasing the Property, the question of whether the rights in the 
Property acquired by Residential were held by the conveying trustee, First American, or by 
Barnson and MERS is addressed only in part I.E, below, and not also here. 
7 See also 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 46 (2005) ("A properly filed lis pendens binds 
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers to all proceedings evolving from the litigation. Thus a 
person whose conveyance is recorded after the filing of a notice of pendency is bound by all 
proceedings taken in the action after such filing." (footnotes omitted)). 
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• That ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien attached to the Property when 
ParkWest commenced construction of Bam son's residence in May 2006 - or six months before 
the MERS' Deed of Trust was recorded. AB 19. 
• That the Bamson Judgment became a final judgment under Idaho law on 
January 26, 2009 - or six months before Residential acquired the Property. AB 18. 
• That Park West's claim against Bamson merged into the Bamson 
Judgment, and was thereby extinguished, when the Bamson Judgment became final. AB 19. 
• That because the Bamson Judgment was recorded in October 2008, 
ParkWest held a judgment lien in the Property when Residential purchased it in July 2009. 
AB 19-20. 
• That both the fact and effect of the Bamson Judgment were put at issue in 
this lawsuit by the allegations pleaded in ParkWest's supplemental complaint. AB 20. 
Nor does Residential argue that the final Bamson Judgment is a nullity, or may be 
ignored, or be amended or modified, or rescinded or voided. Accordingly, as argued in 
ParkWest's opening brief, the essence of the dispute over whether Residential acquired the 
Property free of the lien of the Bamson Judgment or subject to it comes down to the following 
question: Is the priority of a mechanic's lien lost if a lien claimant reduces its claim to final 
judgment? 
Also as in the proceedings before the district court, Residential again fails to cite 
either a single judicial opinion or secondary authority supporting the proposition that the priority 
of a lien in real property is lost if a lien claimant reduces its claim to final judgment. Moreover, 
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Residential's argument that the priority ofthe Bamson Judgment does not relate back to the date 
ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien attached to the Property flies in the face of the legal 
principles stated in American Jurisprudence 2cf and Restatement of the Law Second,9 both of 
which were quoted in ParkWest's opening brief. Nor has Residential distinguished the particular 
decisions cited by ParkWest in any meaningful manner. 
8 See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 462 (2006): 
A lien securing a debt which becomes merged in a 
judgment generally is not affected by such merger. If a debt is of 
such a character that a lien is given by common law or statute, the 
merger of the judgment does not involve a merger of the lien and 
the latter may continue until the debt is satisfied. An assignment 
or lien securing a debt which becomes merged in a judgment is not 
affected by the merger; the merger does not destroy the character 
of the debt. If a creditor has a lien upon property of the debtor 
and obtains a judgment against the debtor, the creditor does not 
thereby lose the benefit of the lien. The judgment only changes the 
form of the action for recovery. The creditor retains the right to 
enforce a lien or gain possession of property held as collateral for 
the debt. The reason for this rule is to avoid the obvious injustice 
of forcing the assignee or lien holder to lose its security preference 
by pursuing its claim to judgment. 
(Emphasis added; multiple footnotes omitted.) 
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 cmt. g (1982): 
Incidents of claim preserved. When by reason of the 
plaintiff s obtaining judgment upon a claim the original claim is 
extinguished and rights arise upon the judgment, advantages to 
which the plaintiff was entitled with respect to the original claim 
may still be preserved despite the judgment. Thus if a creditor has 
a lien upon property of the debtor and obtains a judgment against 
him, the creditor does not thereby lose the benefit of the lien. 
(Second emphasis added.) Accord RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 47 cmt. d (1942). 
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Residential concedes without qualification that a mechanic's lien attaches to 
property as of the date work commences. IO RB 31. However, it nonetheless seeks to distinguish 
the holdings in those cases cited by ParkWest establishing that a judgment lien against real 
property relates back to the date of attachment, II arguing: "This instant case does not involve a 
pre-judgment writ of attachment, and mechanic's liens are not entitled to the treatment afforded 
to pre-judgment writs of attachment, both of which are creatures of statutes." RB 31 n.2. 
Residential provides no argument or authority supporting a disfavored treatment of mechanic's 
liens, which are not entitled to be secured through a prejudgment writ of attachment, 12 to liens 
arising by writ of attachment. Nor can there be any conceivable justification for doing so in light 
ofthe mandates provided by our constitution 13 and mechanic's lien statutes. 14 
10 Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 400, 247 P.3d 620,627 
(2010) (a mechanic's "lien attaches at the time that work is commenced ... "). 
II Ie., BNC Mortg., Inc. v. Tax Pros, Inc., 46 P.3d 812,818 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) ("In 
general, a judgment lien against real estate relates back to the date on which the real estate was 
attached." (footnote with citations to multiple supporting authorities omitted)); and In re 
Rainbow Trust, Bus. Trust, 200 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1996) (under Vermont law, 
judgment lien obtained by mechanic's lien claimant against Chapter 11 debtor relates back to 
date of writ of attachment), aff'd, 216 B.R. 77 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997). 
12 See IDAHO CODE § 8-501 (excluding an amount "secured by any.' .. lien upon real or 
personal property" from the protections afforded by a writ of attachment). 
13 See IDAHO CONST. art. XIII, § 6 ("The legislature shall provide by proper legislation for 
giving mechanic's, laborers, and materialmen an adequate lien on the subject of their labor." 
(emphasis added)). 
14 See IDAHO CODE § 45-506 ("The liens provided for in this chapter . .. are preferred to 
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance, which may have attached subsequent to the time when 
the building, improvement or structure was commenced ... " (emphasis added)). 
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Additionally, Residential is clearly wrong in asserting that "no court - in Idaho or 
elsewhere - has ever held that a judgment lien premised upon a mechanic's lien relates back to 
the date the lien claimant commenced work on the property." RB 30. In fact, not only does 
ParkWest cite just such a case in its opening brief, but Residential cites the case in its own brief 
too. See JI Kislak Mortg. Corp. of Del. v. William Matthews Builder, Inc., 287 A.2d 686, 688 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1972) ("The lien of judgment for a mechanic's lien relates back to the time that 
the contractor commenced work or first supplied material."). 
For the reasons stated below, Residential's following arguments in support of its 
contention that the lien of the Barnson Judgment does not relate back are equally unavailing: 
• Residential's argument that, under Idaho Code Section 10-1110, "a 
judgment lien is effective only as of the time it is recorded and not before[,]" RB 28, in no 
manner refutes Park West's argument that "the question of when a judgment lien is created is 
distinct from the question of whether the priority of a judgment lien relates back to, and is 
established by, the priority date of a judgment creditor's prior lien in real property." AB 21. 
• Residential's argument that "ParkWest cannot revive an otherwise expired 
lien by obtaining a judgment against Barnson," RB 29, in no manner addresses the fact that 
ParkWest timely commenced its lien foreclosure action against Barnson (and MERS) and 
therefore the lien to the extent of Barnson's interest in the Property never "expired." 
• Although true so far as it goes, Residential's argument that "[t]he Barnson 
Judgment did not fully and finally detennine the validity of Park West's mechanic's lien[,]" 
11 Client:2266141.1 
RB 29, in no manner alters the fact that the Bamson Judgment did fully and finally determine the 
validity of Park West's lien to the extent of Bamson's interest in the Property. 
• Residential's argument that "[i]fParkWest's argument were accepted, 
property owners would be at liberty to collude with any purported mechanic's lien claimant to 
strip lenders of their interests in real property .... even an abjectly fraudulent claim could strip a 
lender of its rights .... the lender would not [even] need to be named in the lawsuit ... ," 
RB 29-30, in no manner considers any of the following facts: (i) Residential is not a lender, but 
rather a purchaser who had notice of the final Bamson Judgment when it acquired the Property 
by trustee's sale - and therefore almost certainly paid a sweetheart price for the encumbered 
Property; (ii) Idaho law establishing that the failure of a mechanic's lien claimant to name a party 
holding an interest in the subject real property as a defendant leaves that party's interest in the 
property unaffected; 15 (iii) the Bamson Judgment became final as a result of the actions of the 
lender's nominee, MERS - and not ParkWest's - when MERS obtained its own earlier (since 
vacated) judgment; 16 (iv) because a mortgage lien is unquestionably a property interest subject to 
15 See, e.g., Bonner, 106 Idaho at 686, 682 P.2d at 639 (plaintiffs failure to name 
defendant Standard as a defendant "left Standard's interest in the property unaffected by the 
foreclosure."). 
16 See Rule 54(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("LR.C.P.") ("A judgment is final if ... 
judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except cost and fees, asserted by or against all 
parties in the action."); and LR.C.P. 54(b) (absent a Rule 54(b) certificate, "any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities ofless than all the parties shall not terminate the actions as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." (emphasis 
added)). 
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due-process protections, the Bamson Judgment would have had no adverse effect on the lien 
under the MERS' Deed of Trust so long as MERS retained its lien and contested the amount of 
the Bamson Judgment in this civil action; (v) after the Bamson Judgment was entered, MERS 
could have judicially foreclosed the lien under the MERS' Deed of Trust in this action, rather 
than effecting a trustee's sale during the pendency of this lawsuit; (vi) because MERS has since 
the beginning of this action been a party defendant and the lender's nominee designated to 
protect the lender's interests under the MERS' Deed of Trust, the interests ofMERS and the 
lender were at all times defended by counsel of their choice; (vii) neither MERS nor Residential 
has asserted in this action that Bamson in fact did anything wrong in settling ParkWest's claim 
by stipulating to the terms of the Bamson Judgment; (viii) MERS had the right to challenge the 
Bamson Judgment when first entered under I.R.c.P. 59(e) and then under LR.C.P. 60(b) prior to 
MERS' dismissal, and Residential still has the right under LR.C.P. 60(b) to challenge the 
Bamson Judgment for any fraud upon the court; (ix) absolutely no challenge to the Bamson 
Judgment has ever been made by MERS, Residential, or Bamson herself; and (x) the same 
protections afforded MERS and Residential under our foreclosure laws and civil rules just 
referenced are equally applicable to all lenders and purchasers of real property in other instances. 
Finally, ParkWest would ask this court to note that, not only has Residential failed 
to cite any judicial opinion supporting the proposition that the priority of a lien in real property is 
lost if a lien claimant reduces its claim to final judgment, but Residential has failed to contest any 
of the points or authorities discussed under the following two headings of Park West's opening 
brief: 
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• "The district court's implicit ruling that the priority of a mechanic's lien is 
lost by entry of final judgment is contrary to established Idaho legal principles." AB 23. 
• "The district court's implicit ruling that the priority of a mechanic's lien is 
lost by entry of final judgment creates uncertainty in the law and would foster additional 
litigation." AB 24. 
ParkWest respectfully submits that the argument contained in the foregoing two 
uncontested sections of Park West's opening brief in and of itself supports this court holding that 
the priority of Park West's lien was not lost when the Barnson Judgment became a final judgment 
under Idaho law. 
D. The "Law of the Case" Doctrine Precludes Residential From Litigating 
Additional Challenges to the Validity of ParkWest's Lien. 
There can be no question that the Supreme Court held ParkWest's lien to be valid 
in vacating the first judgment entered for MERS: 
We hold that the claim of lien substantially complied with Idaho 
Code § 45-507 and that the lien was valid for labor and materials 
supplied after the contractor registered. 
* * * 
Thus, ParkWest is entitled to a lien for work or labor it provided 
and materials it supplied during the time that it was duly registered. 
ParkWest Homes LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 604 & 608, 238 P.3d 203,204 & 208 (2010) 
[hereinafter "Barnson /"]( emphasis added). 
Nor is there any question that the issue arising out of Park West's not naming the 
trustee as a defendant was not addressed by the district court before Barnson lor by the Supreme 
14 Client:2266141.1 
Court in Barnson 1. Nor does ParkWest contend that any of the six or more additional challenges 
to its lien that Residential intends to litigate following this appeal have been previously litigated. 
See AB 10 (Statement of Facts ~ 13). ParkWest does dispute, however, that the opinion in Idaho 
Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000) [hereinafter 
Cogeneration II], undermines Idaho's stated judicial policy oflimiting piecemeal appeals. 17 
Thus, in the first appeal in that lawsuit, the Supreme Court articulated the 
dispositive issue on appeal and the court's holding as follows: 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is the validity and effect 
of IPUC's order that Cogeneration post the second security 
installment. Idaho Power contends that Cogeneration cannot 
sustain a force majeure defense in the face ofIPUC's order to post 
the security "for the public interest." We disagree. 
* * * 
For these reasons, the trial court should not have granted 
partial summary judgment but should have allowed Cogeneration 
to litigate whether an event of force majeure protected it from 
default in posting the second security installment on January 1, 
1994. 
Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 129 Idaho 46, 49, 921 P.2d 746, 749 (1996) [hereinafter 
Cogeneration I]. Or in sum, the express purpose of the Supreme Court's reversal and remand in 
Cogeneration I was to allow defendant Cogeneration to litigate the issue of force majeure before 
the trial court. 
17 See Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 618, 790 P.2d 395,399 (Ct. App. 1990) [hereinafter 
Capps] ("on a second or subsequent appeal the courts generally will not consider errors which 
arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeaL 
This approach discourages piecemeal appeals ... " (citation omitted)). 
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Nevertheless, the defendant argued in Cogeneration II that the very issue the 
Supreme Court remanded to be litigated - i.e., whether an event of force majeure protected the 
defendant - was conclusively established by the decision in Cogeneration I and therefore not 
subject to additional litigation. Not surprisingly, both the trial court and Supreme Court rejected 
this remarkably disingenuous contention. Cogeneration II, 134 Idaho at 747,9 P.3d at 1213. 
Accordingly, the decision in Cogeneration II in no way undercuts the legal principle established 
by both of Idaho's appellate courts proscribing the litigation of new arguments that might have 
earlier been raised to challenge the validity of Park West's lien. See, e.g., Taylor v. Maile, 146 
Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) [hereinafter Taylor] ("The 'law ofthe case' doctrine 
also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been but 
were not, raised in the earlier appeal."); and Capps, 117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d at 399 (same). 
In light of this established rule, Residential is forced to argue that "it was 
procedurally impossible for Residential to argue extraneous lien-validity issues in the earlier 
appeal," because MERS failed to raise them before the district court in its prior motion for 
summary judgment. RB 35-36. Two issues arise out of Residential's argument. 
The first of these issues is whether Residential is bound by the litigation that took 
place between ParkWest and MERS before Residential purchased Bamson's encumbered interest 
in the Property and intervened in this civil action. This issue, of course, is addressed in part LB., 
above, and is resolved in favor of Park West by the "lis pendens" doctrine and the authorities 
quoted in Notes 5 and 7, supra. 
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The second of the two issues is whether the "law of the case" doctrine only 
applies to those issues that a party might properly raise on appeal. In other words, Residential 
contends that if an issue is not raised by a party before the district court it cannot then be raised 
on appeal, and therefore the law of the case does not apply to bar later consideration of an issue 
not litigated in district court before an earlier appeal. RB 36 ("MERS had no ability to raise 
additional lien issues, as those issues were never before the District Court on summary 
judgment."). Residential cites no judicial opinion or secondary authority supporting its proffered 
limitation on the doctrine. Nor does the proposed limitation comport with the holdings of 
Idaho's two appellate courtS. 18 
Residential next argues that the "doctrine is almost always applied to appellants, 
not respondents." RB 36 (emphasis in original). But again Residential cites no judicial opinion 
18 See, e.g., Bouten Constr. Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 992 P.2d 751 
(1999) [hereinafter Bouten]: 
The Court of Appeals has ruled that "under the 'law of the 
case' principle, on a second or subsequent appeal the courts 
generally will not consider errors which arose prior to the first 
appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier 
appeal." Hawley v. Green, 124 Idaho 385, 392, 860 P.2d 1,8 
(Ct.App.1993). Therefore, since the issue was not raised at the 
trial court level nor to the Court of Appeals on the first appeal, it 
will not be considered by this Court. See, Post Falls Trailer Park 
v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 637, 962 P.2d 1018,1021 (1998). 
133 Idaho at 762, 992 P.2d at 757 (emphasis added); and Capps, 117 Idaho at 617-18, 790 P.2d 
at 398-99 ("the enforcement of that [settlement] agreement was urged for the first time after the 
case had been remanded to the district court .... [W]e conclude that the Capps were barred from 
urging the settlement agreement as a claim for relief on remand, under the ... doctrine of 'law of 
the case '''). 
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or secondary authority supporting its proffered application ofthe doctrine to only the appellant in 
a prior appeal. Nor, again, does this proffered limitation comport with Idaho precedent, as 
Residential must concede in its brief. RB 37 (acknowledging the Supreme Court held in Bouten 
"that the respondent in the earlier appeal can be barred from raising new issues not litigated in 
the first appeal." (initial emphases in original; second emphases added)). 19 
Residential is therefore required to "distinguish" the holding in Bouten, by 
argumg: "In Bouten, the Court came to its holding only after the district court held a full trial on 
the merits, and the defendant failed to raise the pertinent issue .... " RB 38. But yet again 
Residential cites no judicial opinion or secondary authority supporting its proffered application 
of the doctrine to disputes where there has been a full trial on the merits. Nor, again, does the 
proffered limitation comport with the precedents ofIdaho's two appellate courtS.20 
Residential's last argument is based on the following policy considerations: 
Finally, if this Court were to accept ParkWest's reasoning 
that MERS should have raised this issue at or prior to [Bamson I], 
it would effectively be adopting the position that a party bringing a 
19 See also Taylor 146 Idaho at 709-10,201 P.3d at 1286-87 (holding that Maile, the 
respondent in an earlier appeal, was not barred by the doctrine from raising an issue at odds with 
the Supreme Court's holding in the first appeal solely because the challenge was based on a 
document executed "after the district court granted the motion to dismiss that predicated the first 
appeal. . ."). 
20 See Taylor, 146 Idaho at 710, 201 P.3d at 1287 (where Maile also asserted "that the 
procedural posture of the prior appeal- coming to the Court from an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion-
... make[s] the 'law of the case' doctrine inapplicable[,]" which argument the Supreme Court 
disregarded); and Hawley v. Green, 124 Idaho 385, 386 & 392,860 P.2d 1,2 & 8 (Ct. App. 
1993) (where "in the second appeal from summary judgments entered in favor of the 
defendants[,]" Hawley was barred by the doctrine from raising an estoppel issue not raised in the 
district court before the first summary judgment was entered). 
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motion for summary judgment must raise every conceivable issue 
in fear of application of the "law of the case" doctrine. Under 
ParkWest's urged rule of procedure, litigants would be required to 
bring every conceivable issue on summary judgment, regardless of 
whether discovery had been conducted and regardless of whether 
there existed a good faith basis at the time for seeking summary 
judgment on the issue, or risk being precluded from arguing the 
issue later. 
RB 39 (emphasis in original). But, of course, Residential's policy argument is just the flip side 
of the policy coin to Idaho's adopted judicial policy for limiting piecemeal appeals. 
Or stated otherwise, there are two distinct, alternative constructs for applying the 
"law of the case" doctrine: 21 one of which allows for the entry of multiple judgments and 
multiple appeals in a case, and the other of which "discourages piecemeal appeals and is 
consistent with the broad scope of claim preclusion under the analogous doctrine of res judicata." 
Capps, 117 Idaho at 618,790 P.2d at 399. Both ofIdaho's appellate courts have steadfastly 
21 See American Jurisprudence 2d: 
In the federal courts, the law of the case doctrine applies 
only to issues that were decided in the former proceeding, whether 
explicitly or by necessary implication, but not to questions which 
might have been decided but were not. While some state appellate 
courts follow this rule, holding that the law of the case is restricted 
to questions presented to and decided by the appellate court at the 
former hearing in the case and those questions necessarily involved 
in the decision, and that issues not conclusively decided in the 
prior appeal do not become the law of the case, other courts hold 
that the former adjudication is the law of the case as to all 
questions directly raised and passed upon and all matters which 
arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been raised 
thereon but were not. 
5 AM. JUR. 2d Appellate Review § 569 (2007) (emphasis added; multiple footnotes omitted). 
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adhered to the latter construct since it was first adopted over 20 years ago by the decision in 
Capps. 
Accordingly, as argued in ParkWest's opening brief, because Residential has 
failed to identify any reason that its challenge to ParkWest's lien discussed in the next section of 
this brief could not have been raised by MERS in its own earlier challenge to the lien, 
consideration of Residential's challenge by the district court or in this appeal is precluded by the 
law of the case. The district court's ruling that Residential can litigate multiple additional 
challenges to the validity of Park West's lien on a piecemeal basis after this appeal is decided is, 
for the same reasons, equally contrary to established Idaho law, absent a showing that a new 
challenge could not have been earlier litigated.22 
E. The Interest in the Property Conveyed by the Trustee's Deed Was Held by 
Barnson as the Owner and Trustor and MERS as the Designated Trust 
Beneficiary, Not by First American as the Trustee. 
The final substantive issue raised in this appeal is whether application ofIdaho 
Code Section 45-510 trumps ParkWest's lien in the Property. For the reasons discussed in part 
LA, above, ParkWest contends that Residential's proffered construction of Section 45-510 would 
read out of existence the express limitations on the interests conveyed by a trustee's deed 
22 In stark contrast to the lien-validity issue here in question and the multiple additional 
lien-validity issues Residential still intends to litigate, the effect of the merger of Park West's 
claim against Bamson into the Bamson Judgment could not have been litigated in the district 
court (and thereafter on appeal) until after the judgment for MERS had been entered and the 
Bamson Judgment thereby became finaL See Note 16, supra. Moreover, of course, because 
Residential did not argue to the district court that litigating the effect ofthe Bamson Judgment 
was barred by the law of the case, that question is not now subject to consideration on appeal. 
Barnson I, 149 Idaho at 608, 238 P.3d at 208 ("That issue was not presented to the district court, 
and so we will not consider it on appeal."). 
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specified in Idaho Code Section 45-1506(10). Moreover, for the reasons discussed in the 
foregoing additional parts of this brief, the issue raised by Residential concerning the application 
of Section 45-510 should only be considered if this court were first to hold all ofthe following: 
• That the recorded lis pendens and Barnson Judgment did not provide 
Residential with constructive notice of this civil action and ParkWest's lien; and 
• That ParkWest's claim against Barnson did not merge into the Barnson 
Judgment when it became final and/or that the priority of Park West's lien was lost when the 
Bamson Judgment became a final judgment under Idaho law; and 
• That the "law of the case" doctrine does not preclude Residential from 
litigating additional challenges to the validity of Park West's lien. 
Additionally, before addressing Residential's Section 45-510 argument, ParkWest 
must pose the following obvious question: If counsel for Residential- who also represent 
MERS in this lawsuit - really believe that Section 45-510 is dispositive of Park West's lien, why 
did they not raise the issue along with the multiple additional challenges they made to the 
validity of Park West's lien before the first appeal in this action was taken? 
The starting point for Residential's Section 45-510 argument is the following 
legal principal, with which ParkWest concurs: 
Under ... long standing and uncontroverted Idaho law, 
ParkWest's Lien is void as to all persons and entities who (i) claim 
a right in the Property, and (ii) who were not named, or whose 
predecessors in interest were not named, as defendants in the lien 
foreclosure action within six months of the filing of the Lien. 
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RB 10. And based on this legal principal, ParkWest acknowledged in its opening briefthat its 
mechanic's lien was lost with respect to First American's interest in the Property. AB 30 (citing 
Bonner, 106 Idaho at 686, 682 P.2d at 639, for its holding that the plaintiff s failure to name 
defendant Standard as a defendant "left Standard's interest in the property unaffected by the 
foreclosure."). 
However, as ParkWest then argued in its opening brief, "to say ParkWest's lien 
was lost to First American's interest in the Property is but the beginning of the inquiry, as (i) the 
precise interest in the Property First American held must then be determined, as well as (ii) the 
precise interest in the Property conveyed to Residential by the Trustee's Deed." AB 30. 
Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 586 & 
587-88,671 P.2d 1048,1049 & 1050-51 (1983), and the Court of Appeals' summation ofIdaho 
law in Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 314 n.2, 824 P.2d 887,889 (Ct. App. 1991) 
[hereinafter Willis], ParkWest contends that First American's interest in the Property was limited 
to legal title for purposes of the power of sale under the MERS' Deed of Trust, with all 
additional interests in the Property other than ParkWest's being held by Bamson as the owner 
and trustor and MERS as the designated trust beneficiary - who were both timely named as 
defendants in this lawsuit. AB 31-33. Residential implicitly concedes this point. RB 19 
("because ParkWest did not commence an action to foreclose First American's power of sale, the 
lien was void as to First American's power of sale by the time ofthe Trustee's Sale ... " 
(emphasis added)). 
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Accordingly, the dispute between the parties comes down to determining the 
precise interest in the Property conveyed to Residential by the Trustee's Deed. And in this 
regard ParkWest contends that, for the reasons discussed in Part LA, above, Section 45-1506(10) 
establishes that the Trustee's Deed could convey to Residential no more than Barnson's interest 
in the Property encumbered by ParkWest's lien.23 
F. Residential Is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Residential seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121. 
However, Residential's own authority establishes that Residential is not eligible to recover its 
attorney fees should it prevail in this appeal. See Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 
23 In addition to Residential's statutory argument rebutted in part LA, above, Residential 
cites and quotes a host of decisions from other states to support its argument that "ParkWest's 
failure to commence proceedings against the trustee of the Deed of Trust voids ParkWest's Lien 
as to Residential." RB 9 (bolding omitted). ParkWest does not dispute that these authorities 
establish the common law followed by the states from which these decisions emanate. 
Nevertheless, as argued by ParkWest in its opening brief - and not disputed by Residential in its 
brief - Idaho does not adhere to the common law followed in some states: 
Under the rule at common law, a deed of trust places legal title to 
the property in the trustee. Under Idaho law, a deed oftrust is a 
mortgage with a power of sale; the legal title is conveyed to the 
trustee solely for the purpose of security. The deed of trust leaves 
in the grantor a legal estate which entitles the grantor to possession 
of the property and all incidents of ownership; the exception to this 
is the trustee's power to sell the property in the event of the 
grantor's default on the underlying obligation. See Long v. 
Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 587, 671 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1983); I.C. 
§ 45-1506. 
Willis, 121 Idaho at 314 n.2, 824 P .2d at 889 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted). 
Moreover, none of Residential's out-of-state authorities consider, let alone decide, the effect of a 
statutory limitation that is analogous to that set forth in Section 45-1506(10). 
23 Client:2266141.1 
377,973 P.2d 142, 148 (1999) ("An award of attorney fees is appropriate 'if the law is 
well-settled and the appellants have made no substantial showing that the district court 
misapplied the law. ", (citation omitted)). See also Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 
P.3d 580,591 (2009) ("if there is at least one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not be 
awarded"). 
II. CONCLUSION 
Based on the points and authorities set forth above and in ParkWest's opening 
brief, the judgment in favor of Residential should be vacated and the matter again remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of January 2012. 
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